Executive finding
Three explicit growth assumptions, their income implications and the policy choices to examine alongside them.
Bangladesh 2036, chapter 10 of 10. Contents, sources and the five numbers.
Three growth scenarios for 2036
Here is the arithmetic, written so it can be checked and rejected.
Start from the IMF's FY25 estimate of GDP per head at purchasing power parity, 10,271 international dollars on the 2021 ICP price basis. Take the UN medium variant population path, 175.69 million in 2025 and 196.74 million in 2036, a factor of 1.120. Compound real GDP for eleven years at three constant rates and divide by the population factor. At 6.5 percent, GDP per head reaches about 18,300 international dollars at FY25 prices. At 5.0 percent, about 15,700. At 3.5 percent, about 13,400. These are the same growth assumptions used in research chapter 15. The high path is 37 percent above the low path.
These are not forecasts. They are the arithmetic of three constant growth rates under one population path, stated so that a reader can substitute their own assumptions. They do not estimate terms-of-trade shocks, PPP revisions or changes in income distribution. The annual chart interpolates population growth between the UN endpoints. It does not reproduce the UN annual path, assign probabilities or estimate the growth effect of any policy.
Under these assumptions, the difference between the high and low paths is about 4,900 international dollars of GDP per person in FY36. The calculation does not show how much of that difference a particular reform would deliver.
The table combines dated baseline observations with author-proposed monitoring thresholds. These thresholds are judgement calls for discussion, not validated predictors of a reform or stall regime. Source limitations and definition changes are discussed in the linked research chapters.
| Indicator | Current value | Reform threshold | Stall threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth | 3.49 percent, FY25 | Two consecutive years above 5.5 percent | A third consecutive print below 4.5 percent |
| Tax revenue | 6.79 percent of GDP, FY25 actual | Above 9 percent sustained | Below 7 percent |
| Classified loans | 30.6 percent, December 2025 | Below 10 percent by FY31 | Above 15 percent through the decade |
| CPI inflation | 8.77 percent, 2025 | Sustained below 6.5 percent | Above 9 percent for a fourth year |
| Private credit | 34.50 percent of GDP, 2025 | Above 40 percent | Below 34 percent |
| RMG share of goods exports | 86.6 percent, 2024 | Below 80 percent | Above 88 percent |
| Female participation | 38.7 percent, 2024 | Above 44 percent | Below 35 percent |
| Gas reserves remaining | 8,655 bcf, 29.1 percent of recoverable | Production stabilised near 800 bcf a year | Reserves to production under eight years |
| Budget transparency | 37 of 100, 2023 | Above 50 in the next survey wave | Below 30 |
| Income per head, PPP | 10,271 international dollars, FY25 | Above 14,000 by FY32 | Below 13,000 by FY33 |
Eight policy choices to examine together
These eight areas offer a way to organise policy choices. Their sequencing, financing and distributional effects need to be evaluated together; none guarantees a particular growth path.
Revenue. The tax ratio has to move off 6.79 percent of GDP. Nothing else on this list is affordable if it does not, because interest already takes 35.7 percent of collections. The test is not a rate change. It is whether the online return, electronic payment and third party data matching agenda becomes binding on the large taxpayer base, and whether the statutory regulatory orders that hollow the base are actually withdrawn. The observable indicator is the next World Bank tax series print and the National Board of Revenue's outturn against target.
Bank resolution. Thirty point six percent classified is a stock that either gets recognised, capitalised and worked out, or gets carried at the cost of private credit for the rest of the decade. The prompt corrective action framework took effect on 31 March 2025 on audited December 2024 financials, with amalgamation, restructuring, bail in and liquidation as its tools, and the Bank Company Amendment Act 2023 added a wilful defaulter definition and capped family board members at three. The instruments exist. The decision is whether they are used on a state commercial bank with 5.44 percent capital adequacy.
The exchange rate. The 8 May 2024 crawling peg at 117.00 was followed by higher recorded remittances, and the taka has given up 30 percent of its dollar value since December 2021. The decision now is whether the rate that clears the market is allowed to stay that way when the current account turns, or whether a new peg is defended with reserves. Track the gap between official and market exchange rates, intervention and the reserve position. Research chapter 05 describes the move to a more flexible arrangement in May 2025.
Market access. Everything But Arms runs to almost the end of November 2029, the current GSP regulation to 31 December 2027, and the TRIPS pharmaceutical waiver ends at graduation rather than in 2033. The GSP+ file has to be prepared against the reformed scheme's convention list, and the binding obstacle is the Article 29 textile safeguard at a 6 percent share, not the vulnerability criterion, which Bangladesh already passes. The rules of origin change from single stage to double stage transformation is a bigger threat to margins than the tariff, and it is the argument for backward linkage investment now rather than in 2029.
Gas and power. Under twelve years of reserves at current production, with one field at half of output and under five years of its own reserves, is a decision that cannot be deferred to the next plan. The immediate fiscal item is capacity payments indexed to foreign currency on plants that are not dispatched, at 41 percent utilisation and 192.7 days of payables. The immediate physical item is whether exploration and appraisal drilling is funded at a scale that changes the reserve number, because at 2.14 percent renewables and 21.5 percent coal the alternative is more imported fuel bought with the same scarce dollars.
Women's work. Recovering female participation from 38.7 percent to the 43.7 percent of 2022 would expand the measured labour force, and getting past it requires care infrastructure, transport safety and, in the near term, the SIM registration and account ownership gap that keeps women out of the formal financial system. The effect depends on access to paid work, care services, safe transport and employer demand. A higher participation rate alone would not establish higher earnings or better jobs.
The AI generation. The costs and benefits require measurement at the level of schools, firms and workers. The youth spreadsheet skill share has to get back above its 2021 level of 34.6 percent, the youth AI skills project has to spend money, a national compute figure has to be published, and the computer and information services export line has to cross 1 billion USD. AI policy needs coordination between the ICT Division, schools, technical education and employers, and the observable indicator is the next UNESCO 4.4.1 print for 15 to 24 year olds.
The statistics. Every argument above carries a caveat about which series is being read and on what basis. A country that wants to be priced as an investment grade risk publishes a budget its citizens can read, a national accounts vintage its analysts can reconcile, and a labour force survey that does not disagree with its own census by twenty points on youth idleness. Budget transparency at 37 of 100 and revenue mobilisation capacity at 2.0 on the CPIA scale are the same problem seen twice.
The strongest counterargument to this piece is that Bangladesh has beaten every previous forecast of its limits, and that the same informal, adaptive, remittance financed economy that delivered 6.24 percent average growth for fifteen years will deliver it again. The record supports the first half. It does not support the second. The fifteen year average was built on a gas base that is now 29 percent remaining, a garment preference that expires in 2029, a female participation rate that has since fallen five points, and a banking system whose reported loss rate has tripled. Those four foundations are not conditions of the last decade that happen to persist. They are the specific things that changed.
One result that would challenge the claim that these ratios constrain near-term growth is two consecutive fiscal years of growth above 5.5 percent achieved while the tax ratio stays under 8 percent and the classified loan ratio stays above 20 percent. That result would require a closer examination of the mechanism, including whether demand, exports or credit outside the measured banking system explained the recovery. It would not by itself establish that the constraints had disappeared.
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Bangladesh 2036, the series. Contents and the five numbers · 1 · 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 · 6 · 7 · 8 · 9 · 10
Sources for every figure in this chapter are listed on the contents page and in the series source ledger.
Cite / Reproduce
BDPolicyLab Research. (2026). Three growth scenarios for 2036. Bangladesh Policy Laboratory. https://bdpolicylab.com/publications/three-growth-scenarios-for-2036
Method and source
Source: Primary sources cited at point of use in the publicationAs of 6 Sep 2026