32.6%
Gross non-performing loans
Observed 2026-03-31 [5]
Next steps
Policy Action Room 01
A live decision file for sequencing diagnosis, resolution, depositor protection, governance reform, and fiscal disclosure. Every current reading and policy claim keeps its source and date attached.
Always-on verification
The oldest source-review date controls this clock. Current means BDPolicyLab's published source ledger is within its seven-day review interval; it does not certify that underlying institutions have issued no newer record.
One-minute meeting brief
This one-minute brief is BDPolicyLab agenda triage. It is not a vote, quorum finding, official adoption, or evidence that an authority has acted.
Crisis state
Critical
Movement: Unchanged
Connected official reading
30.6%
Observed through 2025-12-31
Evidence cadence
Approaching cadence limit
quarterly official release
Evidence update
32.6%
Observed 2026-03-31 [5]
-2.6%
Observed 2025-12-31 [5]
Vintage rule: The connected Crisis Orb series ends at 2025-12-31. A newer World Bank release reports the March 2026 NPL reading separately. The values are not blended.
Operating context
The gazetted Act is the current statutory foundation for bank resolution.
[2]
The Bank Resolution Department circulated the enacted 2026 Act.
[2] [3]
Bangladesh Bank added an operational rule under the Bank Resolution Act, 2026.
[3]
Bangladesh Bank published the scheme amended through 9 August 2026.
[3]
The World Bank approved USD 450 million for deposit protection, supervision, resolution readiness, emergency liquidity, and state-owned bank reform.
[5]
Controlling decision rule
These tracks are complementary and sequenced. They do not constitute a bank-specific solvency determination or an official government decision.
Decision readiness
A legal power can exist before the evidence needed to use it responsibly. These gates separate available authority from decisions that remain evidentially unready.
Available to use
The Bank Resolution Act, 2026, the Bank Resolution Department, and current implementation rules provide the legal foundation for resolution action.
Decision implication: Instrument selection is legally available, but it remains sequenced after an independent viability assessment.
Evidence [2] [3] [4]
Not publicly verified
No complete current public coverage figure for independent bank diagnostics was verified.
Decision implication: Do not select a merger, recapitalization, temporary administration, or resolution instrument for an individual bank from the public record alone.
Evidence [5] [6]
Not publicly verified
Deposit protection and emergency-liquidity readiness are active reform areas, but no current public funding-gap baseline was verified.
Decision implication: Make funding, draw, collateral, and repayment rules operational before bank-specific action.
Evidence [5] [6]
Blocked by prior gate
No current AQR-based public cost estimate and burden-sharing waterfall were verified.
Decision implication: Do not approve a public-capital envelope until valuation, viability, and burden sharing are complete.
Evidence [6]
Meeting docket
The docket is BDPolicyLab draft meeting text. Its dispositions and proposed sponsors are not official decisions, assignments, or evidence that a prerequisite has been completed.
01
Ready to adopt
Approve one public framework for viability assessment, asset-quality review, bank classification, and instrument selection across every bank in scope.
This is a process decision. It does not declare any bank viable or non-viable and does not allocate public capital.
Evidence [6] [5]
02
Commission now
Commission independent viability assessments for every bank in resolution or restructuring scope, with signed decision files and aggregate coverage reporting.
This closes the missing evidence gate without predetermining any bank-specific instrument or fiscal commitment.
Evidence [6] [5]
03
Commission now
Quantify the deposit-protection funding gap and approve an emergency-liquidity decision protocol before bank-specific action.
This prepares depositor and liquidity protection without treating liquidity support as a substitute for solvency action.
Evidence [5] [6]
04
Hold until evidence
Record that no merger, recapitalization, temporary administration, resolution instrument, or public-capital envelope will be selected for an individual bank until valuation, viability, burden sharing, critical-functions continuity, and safety-net readiness are documented.
An explicit hold prevents instrument selection and fiscal commitments from outrunning the evidence required to justify them.
Evidence [2] [6] [5]
Decision challenge register
This is a BDPolicyLab pre-mortem for testing draft motions. It is not evidence that a failure has occurred, an official risk finding, or an instruction to an authority.
Failure mode
A common framework can become a paper standard if institutions apply different definitions, scopes, or classification rules.
Stop or reopen test
Reopen the motion if the published framework does not define one viability test, review scope, classification rule set, and instrument-selection method for every bank in scope.
Escalation question
Who can document and resolve a departure from the common framework before a bank-specific decision proceeds?
Evidence [6] [5]
Failure mode
A nominally independent diagnostic can still leave the decision blind if scope, reviewer independence, or signed coverage is incomplete.
Stop or reopen test
Do not close the commission until signed viability files cover every bank in scope and aggregate coverage is publicly reported.
Escalation question
Which banks, portfolios, or reviewers remain outside the signed diagnostic record?
Evidence [6] [5]
Failure mode
An emergency-liquidity protocol can become unbounded solvency support if funding, eligibility, collateral, authorization, draw, or repayment rules remain undefined.
Stop or reopen test
Reopen the motion if the published protocol omits the funding gap or any required operating rule, or if the completed simulation does not demonstrate operational readiness.
Escalation question
What loss, liquidity, or execution risk remains outside the funded and tested safety-net design?
Evidence [5] [6]
Failure mode
A prudent evidence hold can become passive delay while losses, operational fragility, or depositor risk continue.
Stop or reopen test
Release the hold only when viability, safety-net, and fiscal-envelope gates are documented; escalate it for immediate review if continuity evidence shows a threat to critical banking functions or depositor access.
Escalation question
What new evidence changes the balance between acting too early and waiting too long?
Evidence [2] [6] [5]
Public decision register
This register reports BDPolicyLab publication state, not whether an authority has acted. A motion remains proposal only until BDPolicyLab links and verifies the required official primary record.
Decision graph
Traceability joins BDPolicyLab proposals to proposed delivery records and measures. It does not report adoption, implementation, or official assignment.
Prerequisite
Delivery record
Outcome measure
Prerequisite
Delivery record
Outcome measure
Prerequisite
Delivery record
Outcome measure
Prerequisite
Delivery record
Outcome measure
Choice architecture
Adopt one viability assessment and publish aggregate classification results before selecting a merger, recapitalization, temporary-administration, or resolution tool.
Fiscal test: Do not set a public-capital envelope before valuation, viability, and burden-sharing analysis are complete.
Evidence [6] [4]
Apply an institution-specific resolution strategy when the viability test shows that a bank cannot restore viability within a credible period.
Fiscal test: Disclose the valuation basis, private burden sharing, public backstop, and contingent liabilities for each approved strategy.
Evidence [2] [3] [4] [6]
Make deposit-protection funding and emergency-liquidity arrangements operational before executing institution-specific action.
Fiscal test: Publish the funding gap, government indemnity, draw conditions, collateral rules, and repayment path.
Evidence [5] [6]
Pair restructuring with state-owned bank governance reform, capital-restoration triggers, asset recovery, and stronger insolvency enforcement.
Fiscal test: Separate explicit budget support from central-bank liquidity and report recoveries against gross public exposure.
Evidence [5] [6]
Execution clock
The action leads and completion records are BDPolicyLab's proposed accountability design, not official government assignments.
Day 30
Make the decision rules and backstops explicit before selecting instruments.
Window basis [6] [5]
Evidence [6] [5]
Evidence [2] [4]
Evidence [5] [6]
Evidence [1] [5]
Day 90
Convert diagnostics into bank-specific strategies and a bounded fiscal decision.
Window basis [6] [2]
Evidence [6] [5]
Evidence [2] [6]
Evidence [6]
Evidence [5] [6]
Day 365
Execute, measure, and prevent a return to regulatory forbearance.
Window basis [6] [5]
Evidence [2] [6]
Evidence [5] [6]
Evidence [6] [5]
Evidence [5] [6]
Outcome discipline
| Measure | Current baseline | Success direction | Cadence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross NPL ratio | Connected BB series: 30.6% at 2025-12-31. Newer World Bank release: 32.6% at 2026-03-31. | Sustained decline under consistent classification rules | Quarterly |
| System capital-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio | -2.6% at 2025-12-31 in the World Bank release | Restored above the applicable regulatory minimum | Quarterly |
| Independent bank diagnostics | No complete current public coverage figure verified | All systemically important and state-owned banks covered | Monthly implementation report |
| Deposit-protection and ELA readiness | No current public funding-gap baseline verified | Published backstop, draw rules, and completed simulation | Quarterly until operational |
| Fiscal exposure and recoveries | No AQR-based public estimate verified | Gross support, contingent exposure, and recoveries published separately | Quarterly |
Evidence coverage
Verification dates run from 2026-07-05 to 2026-07-05. Financial periods run from 2023-06-30 to 2025-12-31. Partial records inform coverage, not bank-specific solvency decisions.
Audit trail
Always-on maintenance
Next official-source checks, ordered by review due date and decision-file links.
IMF, Bangladesh 2025 Article IV, Country Report No. 2026/024
Review due 2026-08-29
20 linked decision records
3 gates · 4 motions · 10 actions · 3 measures
World Bank, Financial Sector Support Project II approval
Review due 2026-08-29
17 linked decision records
2 gates · 4 motions · 8 actions · 3 measures
Bangladesh Bank, Bank Resolution Act, 2026
Review due 2026-08-29
5 linked decision records
1 gate · 1 motion · 3 actions · 0 measures
Ordered by review due date, then linked decision records for workload triage. Link count is not a source-quality score or authority weight.
No recapitalization or resolution cost is published because no current AQR-based public estimate and burden-sharing waterfall were verified.
The tracks are BDPolicyLab policy analysis, not an official decision or a bank-specific solvency determination.
Decision file receipt
BPL-BANK-20260822-3D0D42C19641
Algorithm
SHA-256
3d0d42c19641f6cb7cb1ef286278c34a99e4dae6b30f7ed6c77bc098783138f6
Public decision content excluding served_at and integrity_receipt. This receipt fingerprints the public decision content after excluding the transport clock and integrity_receipt. It does not authenticate a source institution or prove official adoption.
Browser verification
Checking receipt
Recomputing the downloaded public decision file.