The Port That Still Pays the Shipping Bill

Executive Summary. Bangladesh has expanded the physical movement of containers without capturing a comparable share of the service income around those containers. Port traffic rose from 1,364,139 TEU in 2010 to 3,353,732 TEU in 2024, an increase of 145.8%. In the balance of payments, however, transport service credits were BDT 110,946 million in FY2023-24, while debits were BDT 651,121 million. The resulting deficit was BDT 540,175 million, and payments were 5.87 times receipts. Freight was the central leak: Bangladesh received BDT 28,950 million in freight services and paid BDT 430,502 million, a ratio of 14.87 to one. A port can become busier while the economy still purchases vessels, freight, chartering, agency, and related transport services from foreign providers. This essay is not another logistics-performance ranking. It isolates value capture. The policy test is whether Bangladesh can build the maritime service capabilities that sit around the quay, not whether it can announce another terminal. More throughput is useful, but throughput without service ownership makes the port a collection point for a bill written elsewhere.

More boxes crossed the quay

Container traffic is the visible success. Bangladesh's ports handled 1,364,139 TEU in 2010 and 3,353,732 TEU in 2024. The series rose by 145.8% over the period, despite a temporary fall around the global disruption.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, container port traffic sourced from UNCTAD, 2010-2024.

That growth matters. Containers reduce handling damage, simplify transfers, and allow manufacturers to connect production schedules to shipping schedules. A port that handles more boxes can support a larger trade economy. The mistake is to treat physical throughput as a complete measure of maritime capability.

A container movement bundles several businesses. The port handles the box. A carrier provides the vessel and sailing network. Freight forwarders arrange space and documents. Agents represent ships. Insurers cover risks. Banks settle payments. Warehouses, depots, surveyors, software providers, and inland transport firms keep the movement usable. Different firms can capture each margin, and many of them need not be Bangladeshi simply because the box passes through Chattogram or Mongla.

The UNCTAD maritime profile and the World Bank series describe physical connectivity and traffic. They do not say who earns the freight payment. For that, the relevant account is Bangladesh Bank's balance of payments. It records services supplied across the border, separating credits earned by residents from debits paid to non-residents. That shift from boxes to money changes the story.

The transport account moved the other way

In FY2022-23, transport service credits were BDT 95,199 million and debits were BDT 540,110 million, leaving a deficit of BDT 444,911 million. In FY2023-24, credits rose to BDT 110,946 million, but debits rose further to BDT 651,121 million. The deficit widened to BDT 540,175 million.

Source: Bangladesh Bank, Balance of Payments 2023-2024, Table 5.

The important comparison is not that debits exist. A trading economy should import transport services when foreign carriers offer efficient routes and networks. The issue is asymmetry. Bangladesh paid 5.87 times as much for transport services as it earned. The port handled more cargo, but the resident service base did not capture enough of the accompanying revenue to keep pace with payments.

The balance is not a profit-and-loss statement for Bangladeshi ports. It includes sea, air, rail, road, passenger, freight, and supporting transport services. Bangladesh Bank defines transportation broadly and excludes some adjacent items, including freight insurance. The account therefore cannot be used to blame one port authority or infer the nationality of every carrier. It can settle a narrower question: does the national economy sell transport services abroad on a scale comparable to what it buys? The answer in the reported year is no.

This distinction also prevents a common policy error. Port investment can reduce delay and handling cost without reducing the international transport debit. A faster terminal may make Bangladesh more attractive to foreign carriers, which is beneficial, while the freight income still accrues abroad. Efficiency and ownership are separate margins. Policy should pursue both and measure them separately.

Freight is the core of the bill

The composition identifies the industrial gap. In FY2023-24, freight service debits were BDT 430,502 million. Other transport service debits were BDT 132,937 million, and passenger transport debits were BDT 87,682 million.

Source: Bangladesh Bank, Balance of Payments 2023-2024, Table 5.

Freight credits were BDT 28,950 million, so freight payments were 14.87 times freight receipts. That ratio is the central fact. It does not mean Bangladesh should carry every box on a national flag vessel. Global liner shipping depends on scale, route density, vessel utilization, finance, and alliance networks. A forced substitution program could raise costs for exporters and make service less reliable.

It does mean that maritime policy cannot end at dredging and terminal cranes. A country can capture more value through vessel services, coastal and feeder operations, freight forwarding, ship agency, depot management, surveying, maritime software, crew services, repair, and trade finance without trying to recreate a global liner network overnight. Some activities require large capital. Others require certification, trust, data, and predictable regulation.

The accounting method itself shows how embedded transport is in trade. Bangladesh Bank deducts an estimated 7.5% from cost, insurance, and freight import values to derive a freight-on-board valuation. That is a methodological adjustment, not a measured invoice for every shipment. Still, it reminds us that the merchandise import number contains a transport layer that must be purchased somewhere. The national question is how much of that layer can be competitively supplied by residents.

A port strategy needs a resident-service ledger

Bangladesh's port debate usually asks where a terminal should be built, how deep the channel should be, and how quickly a container should clear. Those are necessary questions. They do not identify the firms earning from the movement. A resident-service ledger would connect port operations to the balance of payments without pretending the two datasets are the same.

The ledger should follow the transaction chain. Which transport services are purchased from non-residents? Which are already exported by resident firms? Where do regulation, vessel finance, certification, insurance, or data access prevent entry? Which service lines can scale without making exporters captive to a protected provider? The answer is likely to differ across freight forwarding, feeder shipping, agency, repair, and software.

Competition is essential. Replacing a foreign carrier with a high-cost protected domestic carrier simply transfers the bill to exporters through higher freight. The objective is contestable domestic capability. Resident firms should win business because they are reliable, properly capitalized, internationally certified, and connected to cargo flows, not because shippers are ordered to use them.

Data can make that discipline possible. Customs knows cargo movements. Ports know calls and handling. Bangladesh Bank records cross-border service payments. Regulators know licensed operators. Joined at an aggregated level, these records could distinguish a terminal bottleneck from a service-capability gap. Without that link, investment proposals can claim maritime value creation while measuring only concrete poured and boxes handled.

What would change this conclusion

The conclusion would change if future balance-of-payments data showed transport credits rising faster than debits, the 5.87 payment-to-receipt ratio falling through competitive resident supply, and the freight gap narrowing without higher costs or worse reliability for exporters. More TEU alone would not change it because TEU is the physical input to the argument, not the value-capture outcome.

Three moves would test a resident-service strategy.

1. Publish a maritime services account beside port throughput. Break transport credits and debits into usable service categories while protecting firm confidentiality, and reconcile definitions across ports, customs, and the balance of payments. Owner: Bangladesh Bank with port authorities and the National Board of Revenue. Success signal: the public can explain movement in the current BDT 540,175 million transport deficit rather than infer value capture from container counts.
2. Open competitive capability programs for service lines with realistic entry paths. Target certification, digital documentation, vessel-service standards, and access to cargo data, not blanket protection. Owner: Ministry of Shipping and maritime regulators. Success signal: resident firms increase transport credits above the current BDT 110,946 million while exporters retain choice.
3. Appraise terminals on total trade cost and resident service creation separately. Every project should publish expected handling gains and the distinct pathway, if any, to resident service income. Owner: Planning Commission and project sponsors. Success signal: no project claims to reduce the shipping bill merely because it increases throughput above 3,353,732 TEU.

The counterargument

The strongest objection is that a transport-services deficit is normal for an export manufacturer that does not operate a global shipping fleet. Foreign carriers provide network economies Bangladesh cannot reproduce cheaply. The right goal is low freight cost and reliable access, not a balanced transport account.

That objection is correct about the target. A balanced account is not inherently optimal, and maritime nationalism can tax exporters. The argument does not require a national fleet carrying every shipment. It asks why physical traffic expanded while service receipts remained small relative to payments, and which contestable activities residents could supply efficiently.

The proper safeguard is to measure user cost alongside resident income. If a domestic service raises credits but also raises exporter cost, it has failed. If open competition allows resident forwarders, agents, software firms, repair yards, or feeder operators to win business while reliability improves, Bangladesh captures more value without closing the market.

The port has become busier. The next possibility is not a flag on every vessel. It is a maritime economy capable of earning from the traffic it already creates.

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Data sources: Bangladesh Bank Balance of Payments, UNCTAD maritime statistics, and World Bank WDI container traffic, retrieved on the publication date. Port traffic and the transport service account measure different things and are not combined into a single causal estimate.

Sources

1. Bangladesh Bank, Balance of Payments 2023-2024: https://www.bb.org.bd/pub/annual/bop/bop_2024.pdf
2. UNCTADstat, Bangladesh Maritime Profile: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/MaritimeProfile/en-GB/050/index.html
3. World Bank WDI, Container port traffic, IS.SHP.GOOD.TU: https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/BGD/indicator/IS.SHP.GOOD.TU?format=json&per_page=100