Monthly Economic Pulse: Bangladesh

Bangladesh has stabilized its external accounts at the cost of growth and household purchasing power, and that trade is not yet paying off. Gross reserves have rebuilt to about $34.6bn (roughly $29.9bn on the IMF BPM6 measure) and the taka has held near BDT 123/USD, but provisional FY2025-26 growth came in at 4.14 percent, well below the 5.5 percent budget target and the second-weakest reading since the pandemic, while point-to-point inflation rose again to 9.42 percent in May 2026. The stabilization is real; the recovery is not. The thesis fails if inflation falls below 7 percent and quarterly growth reaccelerates toward 6 percent without a renewed reserve drawdown.

What to do about it

Bangladesh Bank, hold the line on the crawling peg and rebuild BPM6 reserves to four months of import cover. Expected effect: anchors devaluation expectations and lowers the imported-inflation pass-through that pushed non-food inflation to 9.71 percent in May. Success signal: BPM6 reserves above roughly $32bn with the taka inside a BDT 122 to 124 band for two consecutive quarters.

Ministry of Finance and NBR, protect FY2026-27 capital spending while widening the tax net rather than the rate. Expected effect: supports the 4.14 percent growth base without re-importing demand-side inflation. Success signal: ADP execution above 80 percent of revised allocation and tax-to-GDP rising off its sub-8 percent floor.

BBS, publish the FY2025-26 final GDP and a quarterly series. Expected effect: lets policy react to turning points instead of a single annual provisional number. Success signal: a published quarterly GDP release within FY2026-27.

The case against this read

The optimistic case is that 9.42 percent inflation is a lagging indicator of a 2022-24 shock now fading, and that stable reserves plus a held exchange rate set up a faster FY2026-27 once the budget cycle and election calendar clear. That case is credible. It breaks if the external buffer is spent defending the taka rather than earned through exports and remittances: a renewed reserve slide below three months of import cover, or a fresh energy-price shock feeding non-food inflation, would turn stabilization back into a balance-of-payments squeeze. The IMF and World Bank both project FY2025-26 growth near 4.8 to 4.9 percent, close to the provisional 4.14 percent, so the downside is the base case to beat, not a tail risk.

A note on the numbers

This pulse reads the live MacroMonitor series. The indicator cards reflect the latest values in the BDPolicyLab data house at generation time; the framing above is anchored to official releases through mid-June 2026 (BBS GDP and CPI, Bangladesh Bank reserves and exchange rate). Reserve figures follow two conventions: gross reserves and the lower IMF BPM6 measure. Where a card and the narrative disagree, the card is the fresher machine value and the narrative is the dated official read. GDP figures for FY2025-26 are BBS provisional and subject to revision.

The State of Bangladesh Economy

Executive Summary

Bangladesh's economy registers GDP growth of 4.2%, a pace that is subdued but 3.8 percentage points below the 8th Five Year Plan target of 8.0%. Foreign exchange reserves at $31.07 billion provide 13.2 months of import cover, within comfortable range, though vigilance remains warranted. The merchandise trade surplus of $19.68 billion coexists with a current account balance of -0.7% of GDP, FDI of just $3.0 billion (0.69% of GDP), and remittances of $23.9 billion. With LDC graduation scheduled for 2026 and the EU EBA preference margin of 12.0% at stake, the macroeconomic outlook is defined by the tension between Bangladesh's growth potential and accumulating structural vulnerabilities across the external sector, fiscal space, and investment climate.

Growth Trajectory and Structural Transformation

GDP growth of 4.2% at a per capita income of $2688 marks a deceleration from the 6-7% corridor that defined Bangladesh's pre-pandemic identity. However, the growth gap of 3.8 percentage points against the 8th FYP target of 8.0% signals that the policy ambition and economic reality have diverged.

The investment gap is the most binding constraint. At 23.5% of GDP (target: 33.0%), the investment shortfall of 9.5 percentage points reflects persistent barriers: unreliable power supply, weak contract enforcement, infrastructure bottlenecks raising logistics costs 30-40% above regional competitors, and regulatory complexity. Vietnam attracts $15-20 billion in FDI annually; Bangladesh manages $3.0 billion. This FDI gap is not merely about quantity but about the technology transfer, management know-how, and supply chain integration that FDI brings.

The structural composition shows agriculture's share declining to under 12% of GDP, industry at roughly 35% (dominated by RMG), and services exceeding 53%. The RMG sector's 102.4% share of exports ($49.17 billion) creates concentration risk. Non-RMG exports of $-1.17 billion (-2.4% of total) remain subscale: pharmaceuticals, leather, seafood, jute, and IT/ITES none individually exceeding $2 billion.

The demographic window adds urgency. Approximately 2 million young people enter the labor market annually. Countries that leveraged their demographic dividends (South Korea, Vietnam) invested heavily in education quality, technical skills, and labor-intensive industrialization during the window. Bangladesh's working-age population share will peak between 2025 and 2040.

External Vulnerability and Reserve Adequacy

Reserves at $31.07 billion (13.2 months of cover) must be assessed against short-term external debt of $14.0 billion. The Guidotti-Greenspan rule (reserves should cover short-term external debt) yields a ratio of 2.2x, above unity but with limited margin.

The trade surplus of $19.68 billion reflects Bangladesh's structural position as a net importer of capital goods, industrial materials, and petroleum. The oil price channel is direct: with WTI at $71.87/barrel, the petroleum import bill is approximately $4.2 billion (15% of imports). Every $10/barrel increase adds $1.5-2.0 billion to the annual bill.

FDI at $3.0 billion (0.69% of GDP) is the economy's most conspicuous underperformance. Bangladesh attracts less FDI than Myanmar did pre-crisis. The causes are structural: weak intellectual property protection, bureaucratic barriers to business formation and operations, land acquisition difficulties, inadequate power and gas supply for industrial use, and governance concerns. External debt at 15.5% of GDP remains moderate by international standards, but the trajectory is concerning: growing megaproject borrowing on increasingly commercial (non-concessional) terms as Bangladesh approaches LDC graduation raises debt service costs.

Remittances at $23.9 billion function as the economy's primary external stabilizer. Without them, the current account position would be unsustainable. But dependence on labor export rather than investment attraction signals an economy that has not yet built the institutional infrastructure to attract productive capital.

Monetary Conditions and Price Stability

Inflation at 10.5% significantly exceeds Bangladesh Bank's implicit 5-6% target range. The policy rate at 10.0% yields a real rate of -0.5%, meaning real rates remain negative, discouraging savings and fueling asset price inflation.

The exchange rate at BDT 123.36/USD (weekly: +0.60, monthly: +0.60) reflects cumulative depreciation of approximately 40% since 2022. Bangladesh Bank has moved from a tightly managed peg toward a crawling band, a transition the IMF encouraged but that generates significant pass-through inflation.

The US Fed rate at 3.63% (a moderately tight stance) constrains Bangladesh Bank's policy space. The interest rate differential must compensate for country risk, currency depreciation expectations, and capital controls. The food price index at 162.6 transmits directly to food inflation, which disproportionately affects the bottom 40% of the income distribution.

LDC Graduation and Trade Preference Erosion

Bangladesh's graduation from LDC status, scheduled for 2026, will trigger the loss of duty-free market access under the EU's Everything But Arms initiative. The EU absorbs a disproportionate share of RMG exports, and the removal of EBA preferences (an estimated 12.0% tariff advantage) could erode price competitiveness by 9-12 percentage points against competitors who retain preferences or compete on product sophistication.

Without proactive FTA negotiations with the EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN, the post-graduation transition could deliver a severe and sustained shock to the export sector. Vietnam's experience is instructive: the EU-Vietnam FTA, signed before preference erosion became acute, locked in market access. Bangladesh has no comparable agreement in advanced negotiation.

The graduation timeline also affects access to concessional development finance. IDA (World Bank) and ADF (ADB) terms will gradually be replaced by harder (IBRD/OCR) terms, increasing the cost of infrastructure financing at precisely the moment when investment needs are greatest.

Fiscal Space and Revenue Mobilization

The fiscal deficit at 4.7% of GDP is moderate, but the revenue constraint is extraordinary. Tax/GDP at 7.5% is among the lowest in the world for an economy of Bangladesh's size, 6.5 percentage points below the 8th FYP target of 14.0%. Total revenue at 10.5% of GDP constrains the state's capacity to invest in infrastructure, human capital, and social protection.

Public debt at 40.1% of GDP remains moderate by international standards, but the composition is shifting: external debt at 15.5% of GDP is growing as concessional sources give way to commercial borrowing. The fiscal-monetary nexus matters: limited fiscal space drives reliance on Bangladesh Bank financing, contributing to inflation and undermining monetary policy credibility.

Raising tax/GDP from 7.5% toward 14.0% over five years is the single most important structural reform. This requires expanding the tax net through digitization, rationalizing VAT exemptions, strengthening customs enforcement, and building political consensus for a revenue compact linking higher taxation to visible improvements in public services.

Outlook, Risks, and Policy Implications

Three risks dominate the horizon:

• LDC graduation and preference erosion: Loss of EBA preferences (12.0% margin) without FTA alternatives could reduce RMG competitiveness by 9-12 percentage points. The transition period is finite, and negotiation timelines for comprehensive FTAs typically exceed 3-5 years. The clock is running.
• Reserve depletion and external financing crisis: Reserves at $31.07B (13.2 months cover) with $14.0B in short-term debt leave minimal margin. The trajectory, not just the level, warrants close monitoring as megaproject debt service ramps up.
• Energy price volatility: With oil at $71.87/barrel and near-total import dependence, sustained energy price increases would widen the current account deficit and accelerate reserve depletion. LNG import dependence compounds exposure.

Three policy recommendations:

• Accelerate FTA negotiations and export diversification: Pursue bilateral FTAs with the EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN to lock in market access ahead of graduation. Designate pharmaceuticals, IT/ITES, light engineering, and agro-processing as priority diversification sectors with coordinated SEZ, fiscal, and skills support.
• Restore external resilience: Complete the exchange rate transition to a market-determined mechanism. Rebuild reserves through aggressive FDI promotion (target: $5B by 2028), remittance source diversification, and bilateral swap lines. Address the investment climate barriers that keep FDI at $3.0B while Vietnam attracts $15-20B.
• Mobilize domestic revenue: Raise tax/GDP from 7.5% toward 14.0% through digitized tax administration, rationalized VAT exemptions, and strengthened customs. Close the investment gap (9.5pp below target) through a combination of public investment and improved private investment climate. Without revenue mobilization, Bangladesh remains trapped in a low-fiscal-capacity equilibrium.

Data sources: Bangladesh Bank, BBS, FRED, World Bank WDI, IMF Article IV, Planning Commission 8th Five Year Plan, EPB.